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Even after ‘the death of epistemology as the first philosophy’ was pronounced by Quine or 
Rorty, Michael Williams, the author of Unnatural Doubts and editor of Skepticism, takes still now 
epistemological problems raised by skepticism as not pathologic and pseudo-problematic, but 
authentic and serious in spite of their unnaturalness, which bring new lights to the nature of 
knowledge by theoretical diagnosis about them. 
His analyses about Cartesian ‘dreaming argument’ and ‘Agrippa problem’ concerning Moore’s 
proposition go to the root of skepticism in the ‘epistemological realism’, namely hidden 
presumptions about the priority of the experiential knowledge to the knowledge about the objective 
world, and its objective status as ‘natural kinds’ or ‘an universal order of representations’ in the 
project of modern epistemology. Williams recognizes this realism in the theory of 
‘underdetermination’ of hypothesis by evidences, which makes skeptical situations like ‘brains in a 
vat’ possible.  
As to the case of dreaming argument, Williams takes the externalist position and the closure of 
knowledge under known entailment at once, in order to keep the causal relationship between 
environment and the contents of a belief independent from the logical implication on one side and 
the restricted validity of the skeptical argument of this type in its context on another side. And 
‘Agrippa problem’ as a difficulty of infinite regress of justification in the case of Moore’s proposition 
forces both ‘foundationalism’ and ‘coherentism’ to be fallen into a dilemma, a sort of circularity or 
idealism without necessary external constraints, so that here also epistemological realism about basic 
belief as a sort of factual proposition in both epistemology and skepticism should be abandoned.      
Williams conceives his contextualist model of justification as the third type of epistemology 
inspired by Sellers-Brandom’s ‘defect and challenge’ language game, in which the reasons of beliefs 
must be given against opponents about their epistemic responsibility and adequate grounding. It is 
worth considering at least tentatively Williams’s contextualism as a candidate for a contemporary 
epistemology in the time of pragmatism and naturalism. 
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